Runtime Provenance Guide¶
Overview¶
| Aspect | Details |
|---|---|
| Purpose | Explain the runtime-provenance evidence required for strict assurance. |
| Audience | Release reviewers, security reviewers, operators packaging evidence bundles. |
| Contract scope | Current strict assurance behavior, runtime manifest schema v1. |
| Required artifact | runtime.manifest.json adjacent to every container-backed evaluation.report.json. |
| Source of truth | src/invarlock/core/runtime_manifest_verify.py, src/invarlock/runtime_provenance.py, contracts/runtime_manifest.schema.json, docs/security/threat-model.md. |
Strict assurance requires runtime provenance. The verifier must be able to connect an evaluation report to the runtime environment that produced it.
Quick Start¶
# Validate runtime provenance and assurance contract together.
invarlock verify --assurance strict reports/eval/evaluation.report.json
# Validate the runtime manifest directly against its report.
invarlock advanced runtime-verify \
--report reports/eval/evaluation.report.json \
--manifest reports/eval/runtime.manifest.json
The default invarlock evaluate --execution-mode container flow emits
runtime.manifest.json next to evaluation.report.json automatically. Host
execution requires verify --runtime-provenance host and forfeits strict
assurance unless --assurance off is explicit.
Strict Runtime Requirements¶
- Container execution is required for strict assurance.
- Runtime image provenance must be digest-pinned unless the report is explicitly non-assurance.
runtime.manifest.jsonmust be present with the report artifacts.- Host execution and unverified provenance force the report out of strict assurance.
What The Manifest Proves¶
The runtime manifest records the execution mode, runtime tool, image reference, image digest or local-image allowance, command context, and policy allowances used for the evaluation.
It does not prove kernel-level isolation, cloud tenancy, GPU firmware integrity, or that the baseline model itself is trustworthy. See Threat Model for the wider set of assumptions and out-of-scope concerns.
Recommended Review¶
Before accepting release evidence:
- [ ] Verify the report with
invarlock verify --assurance strict. - [ ] Confirm the runtime image reference is pinned to a digest.
- [ ] Confirm host execution is absent from strict reports.
- [ ] Confirm network, remote-code, and third-party plugin allowances match the release policy.
- [ ] Keep the manifest, report, logs, and wheel/sdist hashes together in the release bundle.
Related Documentation¶
- Threat Model
- Security Architecture
- Security Best Practices
- Trust Model
- Strict Assurance Checklist
- Reports Reference
- CLI Reference —
verifyandadvanced runtime-verify - Public Contracts — manifest schema location